

SYNTHESIS — What we contend

The OPL 245 case and the related proceedings, from 2014 to the present. A single document, by points. English text of the Italian version of 9 September 2026. Each point sets out the facts and the thesis we draw from them, and closes with a note on the support for each assertion: what appears from the documents on file, what is stated by others and is worth what it is worth, what is our own inference.

The thesis

We contend this: that from 2014 to the present the investigations and trials concerning Eni S.p.A. and its top executives connected with the OPL 245 case have been subject to an interference that was not episodic but permanent, exerted from inside and from outside the company's perimeter — an underground procedure that goes under the label of the so-called "conspiracy" (complotto), and which influenced the formation of the evidence, the genuineness of the witnesses, the position of the public prosecutors and, as far as the metadata allow one to say, the OPL 245 trial right into the chambers (in camera deliberation) of the Court that later acquitted Eni —; and that this interference achieved its purpose in both strands, in the OPL 245 investigation and trial and in the investigation and trial of the so-called "conspiracy". State apparatuses, in several venues and at different times, did not stop it: partly because they had been bent, partly because they had been corrupted, partly because they did not want to look.

The outcome is documented and is not in dispute. Eni and its top executives have emerged unscathed from all the accusations, wherever these were brought to trial, and often, from accused, they have become blameless victims entitled to join the proceedings as civil parties even against the prosecutors who had accused them. The internal whistleblower, a former senior executive appointed as Project Manager of the OPL 245 contract in Abuja, has been charged with calumny (false accusation, Article 368 of the Italian Criminal Code) not for the accusations relating to OPL 245 — never really refuted — but for having stated, falsely according to the Public Prosecutor's Office, that he had been paid to retract them; and there is evidence on the record of the promises and of the payments in his favour and of the two or three procedural moments of his retraction in favour of the Chief Executive Officer. The two public prosecutors who conducted the prosecution in OPL 245 were accused by the Colleague who from the second half of 2020 took de facto charge of the investigations, tried and twice convicted in five years in Brescia for having refused to disclose to the Eni defence, in that trial, documents which directly or indirectly came from the Eni defence itself or had been influenced by it; finally acquitted by the Court of Cassation on 18 June 2026 because 'the fact does not exist' (i.e., no offence was committed), with the reasons (written grounds) of the judgment not yet known. In Brescia, at the opposite end, the Chief Prosecutor of Milan and the Deputy Chief Prosecutor were also placed under investigation. In the "conspiracy" trial the Public Prosecutor's Office follows the line drawn by the count of the indictment that relieved Eni's top management of all responsibility; the only accusation today is that of the civil party; and the only civil party joined against Eni, the undersigned, has been the target of infamous accusations that have cut short his professional life and image, with a campaign begun just after the start of that trial and progressively aggravated in parallel with the procedural initiatives — loyally conducted in the open and in compliance with the rules — that were progressively stripping the imposed narrative of credibility. Of the undersigned's own case, by choice, nothing will be said here.

The core: the 2019-2021 biennium

Between July 2019 and September 2021 everything happens: the "conspiracy" investigation reaches Eni's top management in July 2019; eleven days earlier, the company switches on a powerful intelligence machine in support of the defence, screened by law firms and therefore not visible to Eni; from that machine — or in any event through it — it is probable that there came the false evidence filed with the Public Prosecutor's Office in February 2020 by an external lawyer on behalf of the GC; in the same month, in chambers (in camera deliberation), the OPL 245 trial court decides not to hear Amara, who had reported statements learned within Eni concerning relations between the Eni defence and the presiding judge; in the course of 2020 the investigation is reversed, the evidence previously gathered by the same prosecutor for the prosecution is set aside and new, epistemically

very weak evidence in favour of the defence takes its place, in objective harmony with the lines of investigation suggested by the false evidence filed by Eni, the two OPL 245 prosecutors are made the subject of a criminal complaint (denuncia) on the initiative of that prosecutor, and the top executives leave the scene only to return to it as victims of their original accusers; in September 2021 the same machine set in motion in 2019 continues with the engagement of Equalize. The investigations close with Eni's top executives as victims, and then civil parties, the — now past — accusation against them of having promoted the criminal conspiracy (Article 416) which allegedly operated from 2014 to 2018 having been dismissed (archiviazione). The subsequent period, 2019-2021, remains in the shadows and is the least explored by any investigation and by any trial: the facts that occurred in the biennium do not appear in any indictment or in any judicial decision known to the civil party, and the only police report (annotazione) that documents it — that of the Guardia di Finanza (Italy's financial police) of 4 July 2025 — arrived six years after the facts, from the computer of the General Counsel, examined for the first time in 2025. Everything that follows must be read knowing where the centre lies.

The points

1. 2014 — The OPL 245 investigation reaches the top of Eni, and the Government speaks. On 2 July 2014 Eni receives the first production order; on 30 July Vincenzo Armanca, an executive dismissed the year before, presents himself spontaneously to the public prosecutors — he is not summoned by them —, and from his statements follows the entry in the register of suspects (i.e., the formal placing under investigation) of the Chief Executive Officer in office, appointed by the Government in May 2014, and of his predecessor. The investigations, at the outset, had focused on Armanca, on whose accounts there appear approximately 900,000 euros originating from the money that Eni caused to flow into Nigeria for the OPL 245 deal. On 11 September the news of the entry in the register becomes public; on 17 September, before Parliament, the Prime Minister describes as an “act of barbarism” the drawing of conclusions from an entry in the register of suspects, and as unworthy of a civilised country the idea that a “scoop” could overwhelm “the twenty-second company in the world and the first in Italy”. On 7 October Armanca gives an interview to a national daily newspaper; on 30 October Eni's Control and Risk Committee puts it as the first item on its agenda, with the Director of Institutional Relations acting as rapporteur. That Government and the subsequent ones will renew the Chief Executive Officer's mandate in 2017, in 2020 and in 2023. It is the first datum of the thesis: the public shareholder (the Italian State) takes a position before Parliament on the very publicity of an investigation concerning its own company, six days after the news, and then confirms him three times.

***Support.** Established: production order, record of 30 July 2014, entries in the register of suspects; the parliamentary records of 17 September 2014; minutes No. 287 of the Control and Risk Committee of 30 October 2014; resolutions of appointment and of renewal. The 900,000 euros on Armanca's accounts appear from the OPL 245 case documents. Our inference: the political significance of the stance taken and of the renewals.*

2. The pivot: Amara, Eni's man and the man of the State apparatuses. Amara is the company's external lawyer: almost eleven million euros in fees paid between 2003 and 2014 according to the internal schedule included in the 2018 KPMG report; “my entire professional activity was connected to Eni”, he himself states at trial. He was not only Eni's criminal lawyer. In the trial now under way he has repeated that he was the political sponsor of the Chief Executive Officer's appointment within the circle of the then Prime Minister, naming Denis Verdini and Andrea Bacci: Bacci, testifying on 16 April 2026, confirms it in substance — and declares himself a “brotherly” friend of the then Prime Minister —; Verdini, heard on 9 April, denies it, contradicting himself, and nevertheless admits that the appointments of the top executives of State-owned companies were decided at a weekly political table and that “it was [the Prime Minister] who wanted” the Chief Executive Officer. Amara claimed in Potenza that he had always moved within a “system of relations”: “high offices of the State and magistrates turned to me, as to others, to obtain a majority within the High Council of the Judiciary (CSM)”. The Public Prosecutor's Office of Perugia concluded that the seized documents “constitute objective corroboration” of his relations with the Undersecretary of State to the Prime Minister's Office, “albeit mediated by Andrea Bacci”, and that the lawyer “operated [...] as a veritable lobbyist” within “a

system of relations which set out to interfere in the appointments of the top-level members of the judiciary". Among his contacts were also politicians of the opposite persuasion, whom Amara states he contacted in order to gather support around the figure of the CEO subsequently appointed. The circuit was wider than the lawyer: Luigi Bisignani — whom the 2010 Naples wiretaps show discussing the Nigerian negotiation with the two Chief Executive Officers, and who, according to the note of the Director of Institutional Relations of 14 April 2019 seized in his office, had imposed Armanna's hiring in 2007, being "the true dominus of Eni during the management" of the predecessor of the current CEO — was its centre of gravity. In December 2019 Amara described, in secret records, the "Ungheria" network, presented by him as a secret association in some way heir to the P2, with the dinners "in a deconsecrated church" in Rome to which, he says, he brought those he wished to affiliate — dinners to which, writes the same Director of Institutional Relations, he was asked by Amara to have Eni's Chief Executive Officer invited, a request that met with a refusal. The investigation that arose from it, transmitted to Perugia, was dismissed (archiviazione) on 13 September 2023 not because it was disproved by the evidence, but because an unprecedented leak had compromised it at the root, as the judge himself wrote: dead in the cradle. We contend that the trusted lawyer of the State-owned company was, at one and the same time, the company's man and the man of the apparatuses: it is the point at which the two powers touched.

Support. Established: the fees (2018 KPMG report); the testimonies of Bacci (16 April 2026) and of Verdini (9 April 2026); the Potenza request for committal for trial; the conclusions of the Public Prosecutor's Office of Perugia; the note of 14 April 2019; the Perugia decree of dismissal (archiviazione) of 13 September 2023. Stated (by Amara, defendant): the role of sponsor, the "system of relations", "Ungheria". The 2010 Naples wiretaps are referred to in the OPL 245 case documents. Our inference: the conclusion on the man of the two powers.

3. 28 July 2014 — The first video: the guests, the "spy" and the deal on NAOC's assets. On 28 July 2014 — twenty-six days after the first production order, two days before Armanna presented himself to the public prosecutors — in the Rome office of the businessman Ezio Bigotti a meeting is held which is video-recorded without Armanna's knowledge, a circumstance acknowledged by the OPL 245 judgment. At the table, besides Amara and Armanna, Paolo Quinto, active in politics and at the time an expert in support of the private office of the Ministry for Relations with Parliament, and Andrea Peruzzi, for fifteen years secretary general of a political foundation and, fifteen months later, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the public energy company Acquirente Unico. None of those present was an Eni employee: that is why Amara — who in that conversation is called "the sensor inside the company" and "our spy inside the dog" — was needed. The subject was not a dossier but a deal: the sale of onshore oil assets of the Nigerian subsidiary NAOC to a Nigerian businessman, Kola Karim, and the difficulty, Quinto explains, was not finding the buyer but "who would inform Eni of the opportunity to sell those assets"; none of the four had a mandate from the company, and the officer who conducted the investigations said, of that mandate, that "we did not find it" and that "it seemed that they had concrete possibilities of intervening". The deal did not remain on paper: on 18 September 2014 an intermediary asks the Head of Upstream for a meeting for Kola Karim, "interested in knowing the willingness of ENI s.p.a. to consider the possibility of the sale of production complexes no longer strategic"; the next day the Head of Upstream writes to his staff to "close" "the meeting in london pls"; the meeting is held in London on 30 September, with two female Eni officials on behalf of the Head of Upstream and, on the other side, Kola Karim accompanied by a man who — according to Armanna's chats with a journalist, entered in the case file — represented Armanna "because he could not appear"; the internal report closes as follows: "they have passed the anti-bribery checks and [...] they have financial resources, I would say we will certainly invite them to the process on naoc". The day before, the Head of Upstream, Amara and an associate of Amara's were also in London: air ticket and hotel receipts are on file. To the KPMG auditors, in 2018, the Head of Upstream stated that "from the moment I became Head of Upstream the sale of assets in Nigeria was not under discussion". In the video of 28 July Armanna announces in advance his intention to report the OPL 245 facts, and that consequences would follow for Eni employees and for Eni; the company's defence counsel and the Court that will acquit the defendants will read in those statements the proof of a retaliatory intent that would explain the alleged falsity of his accusations, made two days later before the prosecutors who had been contacted a month earlier by Armanna's then lawyer. Amara will state, on 18

November 2019, that it was the Director of Institutional Relations who asked him to record Armanna — later placed under investigation in the “conspiracy” case, then the subject of a dismissal (archiviazione), and finally, like the Chief Executive Officer, a victim of Amara and Armanna —, that they had “agreed it together” and that the recording was “aimed at blackmailing Armanna”; the executive denies it. The video, which the public prosecutors allegedly withheld from the Eni defence, will in 2021 be the basis for the finding that Armanna is unreliable and, in Brescia, for the accusation against the two public prosecutors; although several elements indicate that the company’s defence possessed it before the public prosecutors themselves did: in April 2019, questioned in writing by the journalists of a television programme, Eni replied that the content of the meeting “can be gathered from reading the transcript or viewing the video recording”. The OPL 245 prosecutors will interpret Armanna’s words as a symptom of the fear of his remaining the only suspect (person under investigation) of that time, and that he was to be made a “scapegoat”.

Support. *Established: the recording and its transcript (prosecution document VII.1; civil party’s exhibit E.5 (LSM)); the testimonies of the judicial police officer, of Quinto and of Peruzzi; the emails of 18 and 19 September 2014 and the report of the meeting of 30 September (civil party’s exhibit E.7 (LSM)); ticket and receipts (prosecution documents VIII.67-68); the statement to KPMG (civil party’s exhibit B.16 (LSM)); Eni’s written reply to the journalists (April 2019). Stated (by Amara, defendant): who asked for the recording and for what purpose; the executive denies it. Our inference: that the video was in the defence’s possession before the public prosecutors’, and the reading of its subject as a deal.*

4. 18 December 2014 — The second video, the clearest: the “very great hand”. Five months later, in the same offices, a second meeting is recorded: Amara, Bacci, Bigotti and the businessman Giancarlo Cecchi — “all outside the Eni world and belonging to the world of politics or business”, as the document that summarises it puts it — discuss “possible deals to be concluded with Eni”. At the opening Amara thanks those present, and Bacci in particular, for the “very great helping hand [...] at the time of the appointment of Descalzi as Chief Executive Officer of ENI”; he explains that at the time “there was another person called Vergine who [...] was seriously on the point of being able to be appointed”, and that Vergine is “the sworn enemy of my people”. Fifteen minutes later Amara leaves the room, and the three talk about how to reach the deals through the executives: “Piero tells me that on the specific matter of Congo, that he spoke about it with [the Head of Upstream]” — Bigotti reports — who “thought it right to have you meet [the Director of Institutional Relations] because, Congo being a territory particularly close to the Chief Executive Officer [...] it seems that this meeting was necessary for him”; and Cecchi: “who is the man who deals with these matters? [The Director of Institutional Relations], from what I understood, more than [the Head of Upstream]”. Three things make this video the clearest of all. The first: it is the day after 17 December 2014, when the head of the Nigerian subsidiary ordered the release, outside procedure, of the money owed to Fenog, the company linked to Armanna (point 9). The second: the people at that table were not unknown to the company — Bacci’s name appears in the address book of the Head of Legal Affairs from 15 October 2014, and on 26 November the latter asks his secretary to have a book delivered to “Dott. Bacci”, indicating to “ask avv piero amara for the address”; on 30 October he forwards to Amara a request from Cecchi for commercial collaboration. The third: that video entered the Milan case file only in October 2020, and in two and a half years of trial half a sentence has been said about it — the aside on Vergine as “sworn enemy” —; the first video has been talked about for twelve years, the second, half a sentence. The distribution of the silences, in this trial, is not accidental: it is a map. The “Florentines” of whom Amara spoke were identified in the courtroom by the company’s witnesses: the Undersecretary of State to the Prime Minister’s Office, Verdini “and I think” the Prime Minister.

Support. *Established: the recording and the transcript (prosecution document VII.26; civil party’s exhibit E.5 (LSM)); the testimony of the judicial police officer who analysed it; the KPMG report on the contacts of the Head of Legal Affairs (civil party’s exhibit B.16 (LSM), annexes 5.44-5.47 and 5.21); the date of entry into the case file; the testimonies of the witnesses on the “Florentines”. Stated (by Amara, in the video): the “very great hand”. Our inference: the reading of the coincidence with the release of 17 December and of the “map of silences”.*

5. The system of relations: Paradiso, the Chief Prosecutor of Trani, the Undersecretary, the High Council of the Judiciary (CSM). The Public Prosecutor’s Office of Potenza has requested committal for trial, charging that the Chief Prosecutor of

Trani, later of Taranto, “was steadily selling” to Amara “his own judicial function” at the two Prosecutor’s Offices, with Filippo Paradiso — a member of the State Police, seconded since 2004 to the private offices of several Ministries, most recently the Interior, and “without remuneration” to the Secretariat of the President of the Senate — in the “role of intermediary”, “steadily remunerated”; the consideration being “the constant interest of Amara and Paradiso in the developments of his career”, with “an incessant activity of recommendation, persuasion, solicitation” directed at members of the High Council of the Judiciary (CSM). The defendants are presumed innocent and there is no final judgment upholding these charges, which are moreover also contained in the count of the indictment of the Milan trial. But Paradiso, questioned in Milan on 22 February 2020, stated that it was he who had introduced the Chief Prosecutor of Trani to Amara, and recounted the evening on which “I, Capristo, Bacci and Amara” waited for Bacci to track down the Undersecretary of State to the Prime Minister’s Office, in order then to join him in a Rome restaurant where the prosecutor set out to the member of the Government his own career expectations; and the introduction to Amara of the Prime Minister’s father. Those expectations were crowned with success: in 2016 the prosecutor obtained Taranto — the post which the “Keepwild” memorandum, found on Amara’s computer with an origin date of 22 September 2015 and intended, according to the Perugia case documents, for the Undersecretary by the hand of Bacci, gave as already decided by the “factions” —; in May 2020 he was arrested at the request of the Public Prosecutor’s Office of Potenza, and under the spare wheel of his car investigative documents concerning Amara were found. Amara himself explained what he wanted from Trani: “the action which, through an official of the Ministry of the Interior, I hoped would be set in motion by the Public Prosecutor’s Office of Trani was precisely the seizure of Armanna’s mobile phones and devices”. The same “Keepwild” memorandum lists Amara’s relations with figures from politics and the judiciary “in whose careers Amara seemed to take a personal interest”; and in an ambient (bugged) recording of 21 May 2019 the Undersecretary says: “I already have the Eni card [...] The Eni card, Descalzi handed it to me last week”. The method did not stop at Trani and Syracuse: on 19 January 2026 the preliminary-hearing judge of Catania, rejecting the Public Prosecutor’s Office’s request for acquittal, sentenced the former Chief Prosecutor of Gela to two years and eight months for corruption in judicial acts — to her, the promise, which was kept, to intercede with a member of the CSM for her appointment; to Amara, access to the case files on the Gela refinery and the choice of the experts in the assignments that concerned Eni —, and committed Amara for trial on the same charge. And since 10 May 2023 the Chairman of Eni, by appointment of the shareholders’ meeting, is the man who was Commander General of the Guardia di Finanza (Italy’s financial police) from May 2019 to May 2023: a name which appears, at number 65, among those given by Amara in the secret records on “Ungheria”. We draw nothing from this; we record it.

Support. *Established: the Potenza request for committal for trial of 3 March 2022; Paradiso’s witness statement (sommario informazioni) of 22 February 2020; the “Keepwild” memorandum and its characterisation in the Perugia case documents; the recording of 21 May 2019; the arrest of May 2020; the appointment of the Chairman of Eni. Stated (by Amara, defendant): the purpose of the Trani action (examination — interrogatorio — of 23 April 2018, confirmed in court on 5 February 2026). Press sources, qualified as such: the Catania conviction of 19 January 2026 (hearing for Amara in October 2026). Our inference: that the system of relations operated in the interest of the company.*

6. 2015 — Trani: the fabricated complaints (esposti) and the reversal of the scene.

On 23 January 2015 the first of three anonymous complaints (esposti) reaches the Public Prosecutor’s Office of Trani, reversing the scene of the OPL 245 case: the conspiracy would not be the work of those who paid bribes in Nigeria for the oil licence, but of a handful of plotters who, in concert with Nigeria’s intelligence services, were scheming against Eni to overthrow its CEO. The alleged conspirators are named: the independent director Luigi Zingales, the director Karina Litvack, the executive Vergine — that is, the internal critics —, Armanna and his defence counsel, that is, the undersigned, to whom a handwriting expert engaged by the company would attribute the authorship of one anonymous letter. Other names, which we refrain from disclosing here, were said to have been part of the “gang”. The Potenza indictment today states that those complaints were “drafted by Avv. Amara”, contrived “so that the fact (the conspiracy) would fall within the jurisdiction of the Public Prosecutor’s Office of Trani”, and put forward “the fanciful existence of an alleged (and in reality non-existent) criminal plan” to “destabilise Eni’s top management”: “the intention

was to make Descalzi appear as the victim of a conspiracy”, “also by calumniating entirely innocent persons and also by fabricating ideologically false decrees of entry in the mod. 46 register”. It is a charge brought in Potenza, identical to count A of the Milan trial now under way: a charge, not a judgment. From February 2015, and throughout the year, one witnesses a dense dialogue between the investigators — two Assistant Prosecutors as well as the Chief Prosecutor — and the company. On 20 February 2015, having to choose a defence counsel for Eni as “injured party” in the Trani investigation, a lawyer of the Legal Affairs department notes: “one idea could be Piero Amara”. The Head of Legal Affairs instead appoints a prominent figure of the Italian criminal-law community, a former Vice-President of the CSM. Amara, instead, will remain in the shadows. On 21 May the Chief Prosecutor of Trani receives the company’s top legal executives: the meeting is organised by Amara. On 3 July Zingales — who in the Control and Risk Committee was asking insistent questions about a Nigerian figure, an employee of Malabu but formerly of NAO, and about the OPL 245 deal — resigns from every position, and will testify on 20 February 2025 that he learned he was under investigation only after his resignation. The investigation was unequivocally directed at him, from the very beginning, and the timing — the near-simultaneity between Zingales’s approaches to an American law firm acting as adviser to Eni and the opening of the investigation with the prosecutor’s requests for documents to Eni — confirms it.

Support. Established: the complaints (*esposti*) and their dates; the Potenza request for committal for trial; the internal note of 20 February 2015; the meeting of 21 May 2015 and who organised it; Zingales’s resignation and testimony (20 February 2025); the records of the Control and Risk Committee. Stated: the handwriting report by a party-appointed expert. Our inference: the direction of the investigation towards Zingales and the meaning of the timing.

7. 2016 — Syracuse: the notices of investigation (*avvisi di garanzia*) for non-existent offences, the blank criminal complaint (*querela*, a complaint by the injured party), the complaint (*esposto*) of the eight. On 22 April 2016 the case file migrates to Syracuse, an office which had long been Amara’s territory, or almost his fiefdom, and was so by virtue of the courtroom successes achieved in the defence of Eni: a public prosecutor of that office, a “great friend” in Amara’s words in the Perugia case documents, later convicted by final judgment and removed from the judiciary, had, from 2003, opened and later closed without trial the proceedings on the Priolo petrochemical hub — “Mare Rosso”, the environmental investigation most feared by the company in Sicily —, in which he had placed the top management of Eni and of Enichem under investigation; Amara would successfully defend him before the disciplinary section of the CSM, which in 2012 acquitted him “contradicting three precautionary decisions” — an outcome which the Public Prosecutor’s Office of Perugia links, as a concrete possibility, to a meeting of Amara’s in Rome “with some members of the C.S.M.”. The prosecutor in question was a member, so Amara states, of “Ungheria”. He would be convicted by the Court of Cassation and then removed from the judiciary on charges relating to his relations with Amara. On 8 July 2016 another Syracuse public prosecutor, in Amara’s pay, issues notices of investigation (*avvisi di garanzia*) for defamation against Vergine, Litvack and Zingales: Eni had not filed a criminal complaint (*querela*) and there was no act subject to defence safeguards to be performed; the notices describe the context of the alleged defamation in the terms of the so-called international “conspiracy” (*complotto*). On 14 July the copy of the notice is in the possession of Eni’s legal office hours before service on the only one of the three who would receive it. On 21 July, in a meeting, the Chief Prosecutor of Syracuse suggests to the company’s lawyers, Amara being present, the missing criminal complaint (*querela*); the draft is of the same day and bears the signature of the lawyer appointed in place of Amara; on the 22nd the Head of Legal Affairs informs the top management and the Chief Executive Officer replies “All right”; the criminal complaint — against persons unknown, for facts yet to come, blank — is signed on the 28th and filed on 29 July, when the case file has already left Syracuse. On 28 July, the same day as the signature, the Board of Directors removes Litvack from the Control and Risk Committee; Vergine would be relocated to Amsterdam “for precautionary purposes”, in a “non-operational” role. The proceedings, joined with those of Trani and transferred to Milan on the initiative of the OPL 245 prosecutor, are extremely short-lived: there is no evidence at all of the phantom conspiracy, if anything of the opposite. Amara’s end begins from within the Public Prosecutor’s Office of Syracuse: on 23 September 2016 eight magistrates of that office sign

a complaint (esposto) to the heads of the judiciary, representing “with deep embarrassment” that their own office’s action is exposed to contamination by “persons bearing specific economic and business interests”; among the proceedings referred to is that of Eni’s July notices. From there is born the Messina investigation which in February 2018 uncovers the “Syracuse system”, or a part of it. Eni would never be involved in the trial that would be held in Messina. We contend, and the judgments contend it too, that in those years two prosecutor’s offices were used as a private instrument against the supposed enemies of the State-owned company; and that the notices of July 2016 served to take out of the game the directors who were calling for an account of the dark sides of the OPL 245 negotiation and the managers unwelcome to the top management.

Support. *Established: the transfer order; the judgments and plea bargains (applicazione della pena su richiesta) on the “Syracuse system”; the final conviction and removal from the judiciary of the “Mare Rosso” magistrate; the 2012 disciplinary decision; the notices of 8 July 2016; the email of 14 July; the 21-29 July sequence with the “All right”; the resolution of 28 July; the complaint (esposto) of 23 September 2016. The link between the 2012 disciplinary proceedings and the Rome meeting is a hypothesis of the Public Prosecutor’s Office of Perugia, reported as such. Our inference: the purpose of the notices.*

8. 2017 — The calumny (false accusation, Article 368 of the Italian Criminal Code) against the OPL 245 prosecutor and against the defence counsel. On 10 January 2017 Eni’s defence counsel ask the OPL 245 prosecutors — De Pasquale initially has charge of the Trani-Syracuse case file — to have admitted into that trial the Syracuse case file on the “conspiracy” with the notices of investigation, and the after-the-fact criminal complaint (querela): the prosecutor De Pasquale refuses because the proceedings were still protected by investigative secrecy. Armanna, then assisted by the undersigned together with the defence counsel who had been at his side since 30 July 2014, insists that his own counsel make the same request as Eni’s; the undersigned refuses and on 9 February withdraws from the mandate; the other defence counsel agrees with Armanna and stays. A few hours later Armanna writes an email which falsely accuses the OPL 245 prosecutor and the undersigned of extremely serious conduct: the accusations made by Armanna from 30 July 2014 to May 2016 would be, reading it, the fruit of a criminal collusion between the prosecutor and the lawyer, who had allegedly induced him falsely to accuse Eni’s CEO. There follows a merry-go-round of forwardings “by mistake” and dispatches: the email, originally addressed to the remaining defence counsel, reaches a lawyer in Amara’s circle, then passes through Eni’s legal office — on the phone of an in-house lawyer a chat was found, with Amara as sender, “Max knows everything”, where Max was the Head of Legal Affairs — and finally reaches one of the company’s defence counsel who, together with a colleague, was defending Eni in OPL 245 as well. It is Eni’s defence counsel who file it, not with the prosecutor De Pasquale but into the hands of the Chief Prosecutor of Milan, who has the power to withdraw the case file from the prosecutors if he sees reasons of expediency, on 6 March 2017; on 10 March the same email is filed a second time, by another defence counsel from Amara’s camp, in support of an application for the recusal of the same prosecutor, and it is rejected. The act strikes simultaneously at the two men who had just said no, and aims to leave on the record evidence of Armanna’s retraction and to remove from the OPL 245 trial the prosecutor who was conducting it. The fact is today count B of the trial under way and one of the target offences attributed to the criminal association charged in count A of the “conspiracy trial”, in which the prosecutors have recently requested acquittal for the former senior executives who remained after the dismissal (archiviazione) of the top management. The investigation at the time did not get to the bottom of the origin of the decision to file with the Chief Prosecutor an email whose function could not fail to be immediately understood by anyone at Eni: on 6 June 2017 the defence counsel who had delivered it said that he had not enquired about its origin and had not understood why it had been sent to him; no check was ever made. Its meaning was fixed, in real time, by the magistrate who had investigated and then counter-investigated the “conspiracy”, in the note to the Chief Prosecutor of 7 May 2020: “Armanna’s calumnies [...] against Santa Maria, undisputedly committed in Milan with the complicity of Amara, were carried out in order to favour Eni”; and “the whole Trani and Syracuse affair [...] was put in place in order to favour, in the final analysis, Eni”. The same magistrate would later change his mind. Amara, at trial, stated that Eni’s top management discussed the filing of that email also with a view to possibly sending it to the High Council of the Judiciary (CSM), so that disciplinary proceedings would arise from it; Amara had at the time, by his own

confession, through “Ungheria”, very solid relations at the highest levels of the judiciary’s self-governing body: the plan envisaged having the email acquire “the seal of officialdom” and “cultivating” it with the lay members through political channels; that complaint (esposto), according to the source, was never signed. Our inference as to the purpose — to remove the prosecutor from the trial —, supported by two unequivocal facts: the recipient of the filing was the person who had the power to withdraw the case file, and the second filing accompanied the application for recusal.

Support. *Established: the request of 10 January 2017 and its rejection; the withdrawal of 9 February; the email and its chain of dispatches (the “Max knows everything” chat on the in-house lawyer’s phone); the filings of 6 and 10 March and the rejection of the application for recusal; the record of 6 June 2017; the note of 7 May 2020; the prosecution’s closing address of 25 June 2026 on count B. Stated (by Amara, defendant): the discussion about sending it to the CSM. Our inference: the purpose.*

9. The money: Fenog, NAO, Napag, the retraction and the “IDU Project”. The money runs parallel to the acts of retraction, and the dates interlock. A step back. On 21 November 2014, when Armanna’s accusations had also exploded in the media, and Eni had chosen not to file a criminal complaint (querela) against Armanna, on the sidelines of a Rome dinner with Amara, Armanna and the general director of the Nigerian company Fenog, Eni’s Director of Institutional Relations is said to have sealed — on the civil party’s reconstruction — the first agreement with the accuser; on 17 December the head of the Nigerian subsidiary NAO orders the release, outside procedure and ratified after the fact, of US\$1.7 million owed to Fenog, linked to Armanna since at least 2012 according to an audit by the Nigerian EFCC; on 7 January and 4 February 2015 Fenog wires Armanna 800,000 dollars as “payment for services”, recorded by the company’s internal audit (report No. 46/2019). Throughout 2015 the great accuser is silent. The Eni executive, placed under investigation in 2019 with the CEO, denies everything, but not the accounting and procedural facts. On 27 May 2016, after Armanna has resumed accusing in several examinations (interrogatori), the defence counsel — unaware of the underlying manoeuvres which Armanna and Amara would later confess and which the executive would always deny — files a brief — apparently in Armanna’s hand but allegedly written under dictation from the Eni Director — with which Armanna scales down the accusations against the CEO, and against him alone: the same day the framework contract “for consultancy and negotiating assistance” between Fenog Nigeria Limited, as client, and Napag IT Limited, as consultant, comes into force, with a retrocession of ten per cent of the value of the business procured — the UAE company of the Napag group, traceable to the circle of Amara and of its owner Mazzagatti, which dealt in soft drinks and fruit juices but which, with the consent of Eni people, was accredited in the Customer Register and in short order became a successful international Group; the file, “Fenog - Napag”, was found in the e-mail of Amara’s consultancy company — a contract which already bears, written in it among the projects to which it applies, the name of the contract, “IDU Project”, that NAO would award almost ten months later. The email of 9 February 2017 (point 8) would therefore be the second act of subornation of a witness (Article 377-bis of the Criminal Code), but it is the third if one counts the silence probably bought in 2014. On 14 March 2017, exactly one week after the filing of the calumnious email, the contract worth 70.3 million dollars goes to Fenog, with side contracts of ten per cent each to Armanna and to Napag; Eni’s 2019 audit would report numerous anomalies in the tender procedure of the IDU Project, all of them necessary to favour Fenog, which had moreover bid the highest figure among the participants. In 2019, pressed by the requests of the Public Prosecutor’s Offices of Rome and Milan, Eni closes the channels for the disbursement of the funds by suspending the two companies that provided for it, Napag and Fenog; and it is then that Amara and Armanna go back to accusing the top management, guilty in their eyes of having turned off the taps of the money that had been agreed. We affirm that the dates of the acts of retraction and of the accounting facts coincide; that Eni’s top management, from December 2016, knew from the OPL 245 case documents of the flows from Fenog to its own accuser which had taken place between 2014 and 2015, so that the 2017 payments from NAO to Fenog are subsequent to that knowledge and were no obstacle to the award of the contract; and that no one has ever explained Armanna’s retraction, nor the economic benefits that enrich him and Amara, except as a chance coincidence of independent stories. Our inference, declared as such: that that money was the price of the retraction, and that the return to accusation is the reaction to the turning off of the taps.

Support. Established: the release order of 17 December 2014; the wire transfers of 7 January and 4 February 2015 and audit No. 46/2019; the brief of 27 May 2016 and the framework contract of the same day (annex 193 to the Guardia di Finanza report; testimony of the judicial police officer of 23 September 2024, pp. 56-57); the IDU resolution of 14 March 2017 and the side contracts; the OPL 245 notice of conclusion of the investigation of December 2016; the suspensions of 2019. Stated (by Amara and by Armanna, defendants): the dinner of 21 November 2014 and the agreement; the executive denies it. Our inference: the money as price, and the reaction to the closing.

10. 2018-2019 — Amara falls; the investigation reaches the top management; the taps are turned off. On 6 February 2018 Amara is arrested for corruption in judicial acts together with the Syracuse public prosecutor of the July 2016 notices, of the Trani-Syracuse case file: the arrest is the direct consequence of the September complaint (esposto) of the Syracuse magistrates. Both would enter plea bargains, and a plea-bargained sentence (applicazione della pena su richiesta) is equivalent to a conviction, and the offences of the Syracuse “system” do not so much as touch the final beneficiary. In 2018 Eni dismisses Amara, who as a lawyer loses the engagements of his firm. Between February and July 2019 the sequence is tight: the requests for documents from the Public Prosecutor’s Offices of Rome and Milan concerning Napag and Fenog; the closing, by Eni, of the payment channels of the two companies (the letter terminating relations with Fenog is dated 17 June 2019); the return to accusation by Amara and by Armanna, cut off from those flows; the dismissal of the Head of Legal Affairs, who had signed the 2016 criminal complaint (querela); and, on 13 July 2019, the entry in the register of suspects (i.e., the formal placing under investigation) of the Chief Executive Officer and of the Director of Institutional Relations, as promoters and organisers, for criminal conspiracy (Article 416) and subornation of Armanna, Articles 416 and 377-bis of the Italian Criminal Code. With those statements Amara and Armanna incriminate themselves for the subornation, which has never been charged against either of them, and implicate Eni’s top management as co-perpetrators. It is the moment at which the investigation appears free to run on the tracks of legality and propriety: on one side the OPL 245 trial, still under way, with the two Chief Executive Officers as defendants; on the other an investigation into the top management for having manoeuvred against that trial to their own benefit.

Support. Established: the arrest order of 6 February 2018 and the plea bargains; the dismissal; the production orders of 2019; the letter of 17 June 2019; the entry in the register of suspects of 13 July 2019 (documents of proceedings No. 12333/2017). Stated (by Amara and by Armanna): the accusations of 2019. Our inference: the reading of the moment.

11. The 2019-2021 biennium, I — The machine: Axerta, Dentons, Carr, Kroll, K2, Sullivan & Cromwell, Equalize. Eleven days before the entry of the top executives in the register of suspects, the defensive — and accusatory — machine is already switched on; and the Guardia di Finanza (Italy’s financial police), in its note of 4 July 2025, documented for the first time, from the General Counsel’s computer and smartphone, how it was commissioned and paid for. On 2 May 2019 Eni’s Security department commissions the investigations company Axerta to prepare a dossier on Napag and on the persons orbiting around it, delivered on 29 May (38,462.50 euros of invoices in 2019). On 2 July, through the General Counsel, Stefano Speroni, the company confers on the law firm Dentons engagement No. MIG/1835/2019, internal file “AMARA”; its object, as it appears from the documents on file and as it must be reported in full, is lawful: “action for damages against the lawyer Pietro Amara in the context of the so-called ‘conspiracy’ (complotto) proceedings + action against Vincenzo Armanna, with urgent application before the civil court and seizure of assets”. A company under investigation has the right to investigate: Articles 327-bis and 391-bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Law No. 397 of 2000 (defence investigations) allow it, and the asset investigation that precedes a precautionary attachment is routine activity. It is therefore on what exceeds that perimeter that our thesis rests, and the excess is documented. On 3 July, at the offices of one of the company’s retained defence counsel, a two-hour meeting with Speroni and with Charles Adrian Carr; on 22 July it is that defence counsel who confers on Carr, of C&F Partners, the formal engagement for defence investigations into the natural and legal persons orbiting around the Napag group, principally Amara and Mazzagatti; on 30 July, at the same offices, an hour with Matteo Bigazzi, formerly executive managing director of the London-based K2 Intelligence — Jeremy Kroll’s company —, for whom neither mandate nor invoice is on record, and who appears as the author of a “Viario review” file on the course of Napag’s

business, with Carr among the contributors. Carr is no ordinary consultant: managing director of Kroll from 1994 to 2009, head of K2 for Europe from 2009 to 2017, since July 2017 head of his own C&F Partners; and the chat between him and Speroni, seized in 2025, begins on 18 November 2016, two and a half years before the engagement. Two invoices, of 30 July and 4 December 2019, for 975,660.17 euros in four months, are passed on to Eni by the law firm under the heading “expenses incurred”. It is Speroni who christens the whole “Operation Grey” and who claims its paternity in writing in March 2022: the consultants had been “requested by ENI — in my person”. The final report, “Project Grey — summary of results”, C&F Partners, 3 March 2020, thirty-six annexes, is evidence admitted at trial. It was not kept hidden: the company’s defence itself filed it with the Public Prosecutor’s Office on 3 March 2020, and on 4 June filed the letter of engagement, in which C&F declares that it acts “for and on behalf of ENI SpA”; what no document showed, until 2025, was who had requested and paid for that work, how much, and by what route. And above all what the object was of the intelligence consultancy that Eni had bought. The machine also had an American side: the New York law firm Sullivan & Cromwell invoices Eni, for the attention of Speroni, on 18 December 2019, 22 April 2020 and 30 August 2021, for “consultancy services” on the cargo of the White Moon and on Napag “and more generally” on the “Depistaggio” (misdirection of an investigation) matter, with, as at 3 March 2020, an in-depth examination “of accounts held in the name of NAPAG and accounts in the Cayman Islands” — the very same subjects as the false papers —; and on 17 March 2020, before the Control and Risk Committee and the Board of Statutory Auditors, Speroni reports that with the US lawyers there had been discussion “of a possible ‘self reporting’ to the DoJ” on that documentation, and that they had “given comfort” that an attitude “of ‘waiting’” was legitimate. In that period the Public Prosecutor’s Office of Milan, which would nonetheless come to hold proof of the falsity of the documents filed by that same defence counsel on behalf of Speroni on 20 February, seizes neither Speroni’s phone nor his computer: they will be seized only in October 2024, in other proceedings, and read for the first time in 2025. From September 2021 the same chain continues with Equalize, the Milan hub of illicit dossier-building and unauthorised access to databases uncovered in October 2024 with the publication of excerpts of intercepted communications which appeared at once, at least to the undersigned, almost confessional: on 7 May 2021 Speroni signs a new engagement with Dentons, file “ARMANNA”, and under it Dentons sub-delegates to Carmine Gallo of Equalize. Its men say so: “the arrangement was that DENTONS gave the engagement to CARMINE GALLO and CARMINE GALLO gave it to us” (Calamucci, 16 January 2025); “the deus ex machina was always SPERONI” (Gallo, 4 February 2025). No rule on defence investigations authorises unauthorised access to the State’s databases. On the possible object of Carr’s consultancy, Calamucci — who had received from Speroni the sheaf of documents produced in 2019-2020 — reports that Speroni had allegedly confided to him that he had instructed the “English Kroll”, “camouflaged under a company of Charles Carr’s”, “to invade the phones” of Francesco Mazzagatti, one of the targets, and explains: “to invade means to insert trojans inside the phones”. It is a hearsay (de relato) statement by a suspect (person under investigation), it is undated and it concerns a target other than Armanna: it proves nothing about Armanna’s phone, and we do not use it for that; it does say, however, which method, in that chain, was thought to be available. The same men had in their hands the papers that Speroni was telling the Public Prosecutor’s Office of Milan he had destroyed: Gallo remembers them “because I leafed through them myself”, and Calamucci remembers “scraps of chats” of Armanna’s and “the phone done on the photocopier”, drawing the consequence by himself: “you have to have that phone to make it”. In that sheaf there was also, says Gallo, “a sheet who is Gorelick”, and photographs: Robert Gorelick, whom the Guardia di Finanza identifies as the former head of the CIA station in Italy from 2003 to 2008, on whom Equalize did “a reconstruction”, together with the photocopy of an Iranian passport. We draw no conclusion from this: the documents in our possession say no more. We record that among the papers that came out from under the “doormat” and ended up at Equalize there was also a file on a former CIA chief in Italy, and that the judicial authority knows — the Guardia di Finanza itself writes so — only part of it. Equalize’s relationship with the company begins, however, in September 2021: its men speak of possession in 2021, not of authorship in 2020. There remains the question that no one has asked: the engagements date from July 2019 and the Grey report from March 2020, the documented work with Equalize dates from September 2021; what was done, and by whom, in the twenty-six months in between — that is, exactly in the period of the forgeries

— appears from no judicial decision, indeed from no investigation. There is no lack, however, of clues that cannot be underestimated or overlooked.

Support. *Established, from the Guardia di Finanza note of 4 July 2025 and its annexes: the Axerta engagement and the invoices; the Dentons engagement MIG/1835/2019 and its object; the meetings of 3 and 30 July 2019; the engagement of C&F of 22 July 2019; the “Viario review” file; the Speroni-Carr chat from 18 November 2016; the invoices of 30 July and 4 December 2019; the claim of paternity of March 2022; the Sullivan & Cromwell invoices and the corporate minutes of 17 March 2020; the engagement of 7 May 2021 and the sub-delegation to Gallo. Established, from the trial records: the Grey report of 3 March 2020 and the filings of 3 March and 4 June 2020. Carr’s profile and the identification of Gorelick are reconstructions by the judicial police from open sources. Stated (by Gallo and Calamucci, suspects under investigation): the “arrangement”, the “deus ex machina”, the trojans, the sheaf, Gorelick. Our inference: the excess over lawful defence investigation, and the meaning of the twenty-six months.*

12. The 2019-2021 biennium, II — 23 January 2020: the oral criminal complaint, the “doormat”, the filing of 20 February. On 23 January 2020, during the search of the San Donato offices and in the presence of the Deputy Chief Prosecutor, the General Counsel lodges an oral criminal complaint (denuncia) against Armanina for the bribery of the Nigerian witness who six days later was summoned to appear in the OPL 245 trial, and accuses the former Head of Legal Affairs, dismissed a few months earlier, of enormous enrichment in the Cayman Islands — 37 million dollars — with money coming from Napag, which is as much as to say Mazzagatti and Amara. Speroni indicates as his source the company’s internal enquiries, and does not tell the truth — or perhaps he does, if one is willing to consider that the consultant Carr was in fact at work on Napag from July 2019. The whirl of statements made by Eni’s GC on the origin of the documents filed with the Public Prosecutor’s Office is hard to decipher. If on 23 January the source was an Audit report, Speroni will say different things from that moment on. The final version is that on 5 January 2020 a first anonymous envelope had been found under the doormat of his home, and destroyed; the Equalize people contradict him on the destruction. On 11 February 2020 a second anonymous envelope allegedly arrived at his Milan home, and its contents were filed with the public prosecutors on 20 February. In the package there are the bank transaction slips and the details of a foreign account attributed to the former Head of Legal Affairs, and the screenshot of a chat, dated 24 September 2019, in which a conversation between two anonymous persons is supposed to prove a payment made on behalf of Armanina, with the IBAN and the beneficiary clearly indicated: read together, those documents are a map of the company’s four “enemies” — Amara, Armanina, the former Head of Legal Affairs and Mazzagatti — onto whose shoulders it may have been decided to shift the conspiracy for which the top management was under investigation. The defence’s thesis was a conspiracy against Eni for the purpose of profit. On 27 February Speroni reports the doormat version to the Chief Prosecutor of Milan; on 2 March, faced with the contradiction between his own versions, he states on the record that he had “screwed up” (“fatto una cazzata”). He was never asked why, on 23 January, he had not told the truth to the Deputy Chief Prosecutor, if the truth had been the doormat. In the course of 2020 the financial intelligence units of the Emirates and of the Cayman Islands, through the Bank of Italy (6 and 20 October), establish that the account attributed to the former Head of Legal Affairs does not exist and that the payment never took place; of the chat, on the other hand, nothing more is said; on 23 January 2024 the judge, dismissing (archiviazione) the offences hypothesised by the Chief Prosecutor, declares the documentation false and the account of its discovery “wholly unreliable”, and transmits the case documents to the public prosecutors in respect of the criminal position of the General Counsel. The Chief Prosecutor of Milan, on his way out to retirement, had also entered in the register, in respect of that filing, the offence of unauthorised access to a computer system: it is not on record that the charge was pursued with any investigation. What is not established — and it is the point on which the public prosecutors requested dismissal, on 19 March 2026, and the civil party objected — is whether the person who brought them to the Public Prosecutor’s Office knew that they were false. For this reason we do not call that criminal complaint calumnious (calumny: false accusation, Article 368 of the Italian Criminal Code): we say that the content was false, that the source indicated was not the true one, and that the point in dispute has a name, intent (dolo). Meanwhile, however, the Nigerian witness was heard on 29 January 2020, six days after the oral criminal complaint, and — this is our reading of the records — gave false testimony in favour of Eni, not of Armanina. It is not on record that the

accusation made orally on 23 January was communicated to the OPL 245 trial prosecutors or to the panel of judges that was to assess that witness: it is a “not on record” in the sense stated at the outset; if a document contradicts it, this link falls and not the others. The criminal complaint that turned out to be false was, by its content, capable of steering the Court against Eni, since it accused the company’s great accuser of bribing the witness: and it was not brought to those who were judging. Our inference on the purpose: to steer the investigations away from the company and towards Armanna and Amara, who just then had begun accusing the top management again.

Support. *Established: the record of 23 January 2020; the filing of 20 February 2020 and its contents; the records of 27 February and 2 March 2020; the communications of the financial intelligence units of 6 and 20 October 2020; the dismissal decree (archiviazione) of 23 January 2024; the entry in the register of suspects for unauthorised access; the request for dismissal of 19 March 2026 and the objection; the hearing record of 29 January 2020. Stated (by the General Counsel, in mutually contradictory versions): the origin of the papers. “Not on record” (not known to the civil party): the communication to the trial prosecutors and to the panel of judges; the investigation into the unauthorised access. Our inference: the falsity of the testimony of 29 January in the sense indicated, and the purpose of the filing.*

13. The 2019-2021 biennium, III — 5 February 2020: the seventy-six seconds. A piece of metadata never explained. On 5 February 2020 the OPL 245 trial court is in chambers (in camera deliberation), from 12:21 to 13:18, to decide whether to hear Amara, as requested by the public prosecutors under Article 507 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the secret examinations (interrogatori) Amara had named the presiding judge of that panel as potentially in collusion with two of Eni’s lawyers. When the Court retires to chambers, the exact content of Amara’s statements is unknown, although from the prosecutors’ application one could trace the person of whom Amara had spoken. The nine files of Amara’s secret records appear to have been opened, on the hard disk of the non-commissioned officer who was their sole custodian, all between 12:35:16 and 12:36:32 — seventy-six seconds, which fall within the period in which the Court is in chambers —: this is recorded by the judicial police report (annotazione) of 30 June 2022, in the proceedings on the leak of the records, which examined those devices for the first time two years later; the non-commissioned officer had died on 9 February 2020, four days after the hearing, and a second hard disk, encrypted, has never been opened. The documents on Amara’s words about the panel had been transmitted by the Chief Prosecutor of Milan to Brescia on 4 February, the day before the hearing; the Brescia investigation closed with a dismissal (archiviazione), requested on 21 December 2020 without Amara being heard, whose reasoning says that what was set out does not lead “to doubt the reliability of the declarant Amara” and that “the element of the promise or payment of money or other benefit” is lacking: not reliability, then, but the elements of the offence. On 17 February 2020 Armanna produced out of the blue, to the two prosecutors of the “conspiracy” investigation, a page of Amara’s classified records, later stating that he had received them indirectly from Filippo Paradiso, who was selling them for money: the prosecutors, faced with the evidence of the leak of the “secret” records to the outside, open no investigation; and in any event it is not on record that that access of 5 February was investigated. The leak of the records, when it was prosecuted, two years later, was prosecuted in another direction and for another fact: the prosecutor in charge of the “conspiracy” investigation was acquitted in Brescia for the handing of the records to a member of the High Council of the Judiciary (CSM) (7 March 2022, upheld on 3 November 2022), while the member was convicted with final effect on 29 January 2025. Finally, on 20 February 2026 the Court of Milan acquitted Amara of the charge of having himself leaked the record of his own examination (interrogatorio). Armanna has been convicted of calumny against Paradiso. The leak of early February 2020 remains without a name. We assert nothing else on the point.

Support. *Established: the record of the hearing of 5 February 2020 with the times of the in camera deliberation; the police report (annotazione) of 30 June 2022 (proceedings No. 3188/2022); the transmission to Brescia of 4 February 2020 and the dismissal decision (archiviazione); the record of 17 February 2020, admitted at trial; the judgments of 2022, of 2025 and of 20 February 2026. “Not on record” (not known to the civil party): an investigation into the access of 5 February 2020. Established: Armanna’s conviction for calumny against Paradiso. The name given by Amara is hearsay (de relato) from a defendant, and remains such. Stated (by Armanna, defendant): the provenance of the records from Paradiso. Our inference: none, beyond recording the coincidence.*

14. The 2019-2021 biennium, IV — The fake chat and the real chat. It is a fact of the utmost importance, and it is also the simplest, provided one takes it in order.

First — what was filed. In the package of 20 February 2020 filed by the lawyer on behalf of Eni's GC there is a sheet with the details of a foreign account presented as traceable to Eni's former Head of Legal Affairs: National Bank of Abu Dhabi, an IBAN, and as account holder a Dubai company, Taha Limited, with registered office, registration number and name of the representative. The account into which the funds allegedly arrived that were then to be used to pay Armanna's witnesses for OPL 245.

Second — what was in Armanna's phone. The State acquires that phone on 5 November 2020, eight and a half months later. Inside, under the date of 20 August 2019, there is a WhatsApp conversation between Armanna and a man named Francesco Renda, saved in the contacts under another name: they talk about a bank transfer to be made to a Dubai account, and at 13:59 Armanna sends him a pdf with the details of that account. It is the Taha Limited account.

Third — the comparison. It is the Guardia di Finanza that places them side by side, in the police report (annotazione) of 4 July 2025, at page 128. It is reproduced here as it stands.

NATIONAL BANK OF ABU DHABI BIC NBADAEAXXX IBAN AE500351901323869164031 CONTO INTESSTATO A [ACCOUNT HELD BY] TaHa Limited Suite 1, Al Harti Building Al Mina Road Bur Dubai, Dubai United Arab Emirates Registration Number: IC2811/10-RAKFTZ Represented by: Syed Ahmed (firma libera sul conto) [sole signatory]	TaHa Limited Suite 1, Al Harti Building Al Mina Road Bur Dubai, Dubai United Arab Emirates Registration Number: IC2811/10-RAKFTZ Represented by: Syed Ahmed Position: Director Account Name: TAHA LIMITED SWIFT: NBADAEAXXX Account Number 1901323869164031 IBAN AE500351901323869164031 Currency EUR
Filed by the company's defence counsel, 20.02.2020	WhatsApp chat of 20.08.2019 (Armanna's phone)

Source: Guardia di Finanza, Milan Economic and Financial Police Unit, police report (annotazione) of 4 July 2025, p. 128 (proceedings No. 25203/22). The conclusion is the Guardia di Finanza's, which underlines it: "From the comparison of the two documents it is possible to note that both documents refer to the same current account and to the same company holding it, namely the aforesaid TAHA LIMITED".

Fourth — why it matters. The document filed with the Public Prosecutor's Office on 20 February 2020 reproduces data which, at that date, were to be found in only one known place: inside Armanna's phone, in a private conversation of 20 August 2019. The State takes that phone on 5 November 2020, and the chat appears in the case documents on 10 March 2021. The inference follows, and we declare it as such: whoever fabricated the forgery knew the contents of that phone at least eight and a half months before the State had it. The same applies to the second paper: the screenshot filed bears the date of 24 September 2019 and reproduces, line by line, authentic conversations present in the same phone about the arrival of the Nigerian witness, which however are from a month later. Whoever fabricated it backdated the copy with respect to the original it was copying. The real chat was available, because it was actually extracted from Armanna's mobile phone in March 2021: the comparison with the fake chat was made neither in March 2021, when the chat emerged, nor, likewise, in 2022. The fact emerges with the undersigned's criminal complaint of 17 December 2024, and the police report (annotazione) of 4 July 2025 confirmed it, as just written.

Fifth — the alternative explanations and their limits. The first: Armanna had himself sent the file to Renda, and from that side it could have reached the fabricators and then the users. This is true, and it must be said. But it does not explain why the date and the account holder were changed; it does not explain the conversation between strangers built around the attachment; and it leads in any event to Renda, whom the Guardia di Finanza identified on 20 March 2021 and who has never been heard, not even for a witness statement (sommarie informazioni) — the same police report places him, citing an article of 22 March 2025, in a Rome-based illicit dossier-building hub competing with Equalize. The second objection is technical: in the phone there is a restore from a backup of 2 November 2020 from a computer attributable to the owner, and no trace of transmission has ever been found. The third comes from those who investigated, and must be reported in complete

fairness: in the General Counsel's devices no evidence was reportedly found of his direct involvement in the fabrication, and the note of 4 July 2025 indicates three possible authors — Amara, Armanna or the General Counsel himself —, listing for each the elements in favour. Again for completeness: the two hypotheses, Armanna and Amara, if accepted, lead to the conclusion that the two would have calumniated themselves, moreover supplying Eni, which they were meanwhile accusing before the Public Prosecutor's Office, with the Ariadne's thread for tracing the matter back to them. The prosecutor in charge of the "conspiracy" investigation, heard as a witness in Brescia, swore that he had been certain that the author of the "pantomime" was Armanna, and that he had later changed his mind. For the third the note sets out the contradictions in his statements, the fact that the documents he said he had destroyed were instead shown to the two Equalize men, the hostility towards Mazzagatti reported by those two, the explicit request for "negative reports", and the fact that Eni bore the legal costs of one of them in the criminal complaint (*querela*, a complaint by the injured party) lodged by Mazzagatti.

Sixth — the two nameless machines, and who made the comparison. The prosecutor's expert established that "four, possibly five" computers had had full access to Armanna's phone: three within the owner's family circle, and two outside it — a Mac Mini of unknown location and one that the expert described as "another very strange one called John Doe". The technical examination capable of giving them a name — the comparison with the devices in use, between October 2019 and February 2020, by the company's Legal Affairs department and by the men of Operation Grey — was requested and refused. As for the comparison between the two chats, no one had made it: neither the public prosecutors, nor the judicial police, not even when it was interrogating the copy of that phone to build the case against Armanna. The undersigned was the first to make it, with the criminal complaint of 17 December 2024; the police report (*annotazione*) of 4 July 2025 corroborated its substance six and a half months later. And there is one last fact, in the same report: on 13 January 2022 the General Counsel and the company's defence counsel handed the Public Prosecutor's Office a list of keywords on which to carry out checks, and in that list appears "Renda Francesco"; in the General Counsel's computer nineteen successive versions of that file were found, all created between 11 and 13 January 2022. Whoever, in January 2022, was searching Armanna's phone for the name of the interlocutor in the real chat already knew that that name was to be searched for.

Seventh — the coherence of the picture. The hypothesis that the technical and legal defence had unlawful access to Armanna's phone before its seizure is consistent with the facts that emerged in 2025 thanks to the Guardia di Finanza, concerning Operation Grey, and above all with the statements of the two Equalize men, with the oral criminal complaint of 23 January and then the filing of the documents, chat included, of 20 February, and lastly with the connection of a "John Doe" computer to Armanna's mobile phone.

Support. *Established: the contents of the package of 20 February 2020; the forensic copy of Armanna's phone (5 November 2020) and the chat of 20 August 2019, on file since 10 March 2021; the comparison at p. 128 of the police report (annotazione) of 4 July 2025 and its conclusion; the expert's report on the computers with access to the phone; the order that refused the technical examination; the list of keywords of 13 January 2022 and its nineteen versions; the criminal complaint of 17 December 2024. Stated: the judicial police's assessment of the three possible authors, and the prosecutor's testimony in Brescia. Our inference: that whoever fabricated the forgery knew the contents of the phone before the State did, and what follows from it.*

15. The 2019-2021 biennium, V — 2021: the U-turn, and the evidence left hanging in mid-air. On 14 January 2021 note No. 23961 of the Guardia di Finanza (Italy's financial police) reads the chats and the telephone calls between Armanna and the Nigerians of Fenog and concludes that they speak of money and of business, not of witnesses. On 19 February 2021 the prosecutor in charge of the so-called "conspiracy" (*complotto*) investigation transmits to the two OPL 245 prosecutors a ninety-eight-page draft report, built on the contents of Armanna's telephone to demonstrate that he had allegedly paid the witnesses — together with other accusations constructed with limitations surprising in a prosecutor as unquestionably able as he is, such as the supposed falsity of chats from 2013, hence irrelevant, a geolocation meant to rule out a corrupt agreement of uncertain date without using the phone records of the person who disputed the agreement, and more —, demanding that it be filed with the Eni defence as necessary to prove Armanna's unreliability in OPL 245, when by then the evidentiary phase of the trial had long been

closed and the reading of the verdict appeared imminent. In those draft pages the chat filed by the company's defence, the one through which the thesis of the bribing of the Nigerian witnesses had entered the office, and which was fake, is never mentioned: neither the chat, nor the account, nor the account holder, nor even the false bank documents on Napag and Mantovani. Nine days later an internal chat of the office, produced by the same prosecutor, records the direction taken: "We have to arrest them. Soon... mantovani bank statements. He paid the Nigerian witnesses. What more do you want" — the bank statements were those that the financial intelligence units had declared false the previous October —; a request for pre-trial detention against Armanna, of about one hundred pages, was drawn up and stopped by the Deputy Chief Prosecutor. On 5 March 2021 the two OPL 245 prosecutors to whom the confused material had been sent refuse in writing, on the merits and on the method: the judicial police "did not understand what the subject of the discussions was" and "formulated arbitrary hypotheses" about the chats in which Armanna speaks of fifty thousand dollars. In the papers, in fact, the money is not the price of a testimony but of a document: "the efcc file", the report of the Nigerian anti-corruption authority with the list of the beneficiaries of the OPL 245 money, of which Armanna had spoken on the record as early as 13 July 2016. The final version of the police report (annotazione), dated 7 April 2021, removes the "payment of the witnesses" and writes that the file "would plausibly be an EFCC document". No one at the Public Prosecutor's Office looked for that document, which after all was of use to the investigation into the corruption in Nigeria, though not to the need to prove Armanna's unreliability. On 17 March 2021 the Court acquits all the OPL 245 defendants, and grounds Armanna's unreliability on the video shot in Bigotti's office — the one that the prosecutors allegedly refused to the Eni defence, although several elements indicate that the company's defence possessed it before the prosecutors themselves (point 3). On 5 November 2021, one year after a technical expert examination had been ordered to establish whether the 2013 chats between Armanna, the Chief Executive Officer and the Director of Institutional Relations were authentic, the expert finds selective alterations on the 2013 chats alone, which are procedurally irrelevant: Armanna's accusations date from the following year, and one does not retract in advance what one has not yet said. Five days after the filing of the report Armanna is entered in the register of suspects (i.e., formally placed under investigation) for calumny (false accusation, Article 368 of the Italian Criminal Code); one month later, on 10 December, the positions of the top management are severed and set on course for dismissal for not having committed subornation of a witness (Article 377-bis of the Criminal Code) against Armanna and for not having taken part in the criminal association that existed between 2014 and 2018. The lawful explanation exists, and must be stated first: once an alteration in the evidence of the principal accuser has been established, the prosecutor who makes the entry does what Article 358 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires of him. What it does not cover is the rest: the expert does not attribute that alteration to anyone, and among the machines with full access to the telephone there were two without a name; and in the same office, in the same period, the falsity of the documents filed by the company's defence — established as early as October 2020 — produces no symmetrical entry in the register, and it is not on record that any investigation was carried out into who fabricated that forgery. In five weeks accuser and accused exchange roles: in July 2019 the Chief Executive Officer and the Director of Institutional Relations were charged with the subornation of Armanna; in November 2021 it is Armanna and Amara who are entered in the register of suspects for calumny against the top management. The fact is documentary; the overall reading is ours: that the evidence constructed from the second half of 2020 onwards is weak, that the evidence gathered in 2019 dropped off the investigation's radar, and that the one-hundred-and-eighty-degree reorientation was induced by the material introduced by the company's defence, not by the autonomous evolution of the evidence. The causal link is not written in any document: we infer it from the sequence and from the content, and it is our most demanding assertion.

Support. *Established: note No. 23961 of 14 January 2021; the draft of 19 February 2021 (in the Brescia case file, annex 11 of the documents produced at trial) and its final version of 7 April 2021; the office's internal chat; the observations of 5 March 2021; the judgment of 17 March 2021; the expert's report of 5 November 2021; the entry in the register of suspects of 10 November and the severance of 10 December 2021. Stated, by the Deputy Chief Prosecutor in Brescia: the detention request that was stopped. 'Not on record' (not known to the civil party): an investigation into who fabricated the forgery. Our inference: the link between the defence's material and the U-turn.*

16. Brescia — The accusation and the conviction of the two prosecutors: the heart of the reversal. It is the refusal of 5 March 2021 to file with the Eni defence — together with the video of 28 July 2014 and other documents — that in Brescia was charged as an offence against the two OPL 245 prosecutors: refusal to perform official acts (Article 328 of the Criminal Code), for not having made available to the Eni defence, in that trial, material which, however, directly or indirectly came from that same Eni defence. The accusation was born from the Colleague: the prosecutor in charge of the “conspiracy” investigation, who had built the draft of 19 February 2021 on the material introduced by the company’s defence and had seen its filing refused, was its source, and in Brescia testified as a witness. The trial lasted five years: conviction at first instance — in October 2024, to eight months, according to press reports —, upheld on appeal; quashed without remand by the Court of Cassation on 18 June 2026 because ‘the fact does not exist’ (i.e., no offence was committed), with the reasons (written grounds) of the judgment not yet filed. The career consequences had meanwhile materialised: on 8 May 2024 the High Council of the Judiciary (CSM) had denied the first of the two confirmation in his semi-managerial functions, and — according to press reports of 21 August 2026 — he has since left the judiciary, bringing forward his retirement. In Brescia, conversely, the Chief Prosecutor and the Deputy Chief Prosecutor of Milan were also placed under investigation — the latter had received the oral criminal complaint of 23 January 2020 and the false papers, did not endorse the request for Armanna’s pre-trial detention and insisted with the Colleague on examining Speroni as a suspect, and hence with a lawyer; the former, among other things, had entered in the register, against persons unknown, the offence of unauthorised access to a computer system after having seen the false documents filed by Eni’s defence —; and in Brescia the very accuser of the two prosecutors was in turn put on trial, for the handing over of Amara’s secret records, and acquitted for want of intent. The company followed that trial from within: the engagement conferred by the General Counsel on Dentons on 7 May 2021, file “ARMANNA” — the same under which Equalize would later work —, includes, among the “main activities carried out”, the “preparation and filing of an application under Article 116 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (request for copies of case documents) with the Public Prosecutor’s Office of Brescia”, that is, the request for copies of the documents of the proceedings against the two prosecutors, alongside the examination of the documentation on Armanna “regarding the OPL 245 and conspiracy matters” and the review of Equalize’s report. For this is the heart of the reversal. The same corpus — Armanna’s telephone, the chats about the fifty thousand dollars, the video — was deemed in one forum so precious that failing to file it with the company’s defence was charged as an offence, and in the other so solid as to overturn the trial in the company’s favour: in the two forums the same material received two opposite readings, and the only constant is the beneficiary. And the accusation removed from the scene — for five years, and for one of the two for good — the magistrates who had sustained the prosecution in OPL 245, who in January 2017 had refused to let the Syracuse “conspiracy” file into that trial, and who in March 2021 had refused the draft built on the defence’s material. In July 2019 the top management were under investigation for subornation, Article 377-bis, and the OPL 245 prosecutor was, together with the undersigned, the victim of a calumny “committed to favour Eni”, as the office wrote in May 2020; from 2021 those two prosecutors are under accusation, then defendants; the top management are injured parties, and the accuser is a defendant charged with calumny. Victims and perpetrators have swapped places, entirely: it is the switching that the rest of the document describes in its successive stages, and here lies its pivot. That the investigations from which that accusation was born were of evident carelessness is our assessment, that of a party which has had no access to that file; it rests on three facts: the video that the defence already possessed when it complained of its being refused (point 3), the draft that was silent about the fake chat from which it had started, and the final outcome, “the fact does not exist”.

Support. Established: the observations of 5 March 2021; the Court of Cassation’s verdict of 18 June 2026; the resolution of the High Council of the Judiciary (CSM) of 8 May 2024; the Brescia judgments of 7 March and 3 November 2022; the Dentons engagement of 7 May 2021 (note of the Guardia di Finanza of 4 July 2025); Eni’s written reply of April 2019; the note to the Chief Prosecutor of 7 May 2020. Press sources, qualified as such: the date and the measure of the first-instance sentence; the confirmation on appeal; the departure from the judiciary. The Brescia entries in the register of suspects of the Chief Prosecutor and of the Deputy Chief Prosecutor: a

fact known to the civil party, which does not have the documents. Our inference: the carelessness of the investigations, and the reading of the reversal.

17. The reversal completed: the count of the indictment, the rejections, the prosecution's closing address. The "conspiracy" trial is held on a count that describes an association composed of Amara, Armanina and others, former Eni executives but not the top management, and in which the company appears as civilly liable party and its top executives as injured parties, victims of the two who allegedly calumniated them. That the count is written in line with the favour reserved for the company and its top management is our assessment, and we declare it as such. In May 2026 the civil party requests the only examination capable of giving a name to the two computers — one a "John Doe" — that accessed Armanina's telephone before the State did: the Court rejects it as irrelevant, and with the order of 21 May 2026 declares the material of the second current irrelevant. Perhaps it is right: the facts narrated here — with the crucial period 2019-2021 — would probably belong to a new investigation, which the Public Prosecutor's Office of Milan does not appear willing to open. On 25 June 2026 the prosecution's closing address seeks the conviction only of the executors of the first current, 2014-2018 — Armanina, Amara and an in-house lawyer of the company — and of Mazzagatti on a different charge: three of the four are exactly the persons on whom the General Counsel had commissioned the due diligence in 2019, and who appeared involved in the false documentation filed on his behalf on 20 February 2020. No request concerns those who commissioned and paid for that operation. The only calumny that the closing address acknowledges as "proven and likewise time-barred" is that of count B, the e-mail of 9 February 2017 against the OPL 245 prosecutor and against the undersigned (point 8). The conviction of the targets of the factory is sought, and the dismissal (archiviazione) of the factory. The closing address itself had begun with a confession: "a long evidentiary phase, but not for that reason a complete one", and the feeling "that it is in fact the criminal trial itself, with its rightful rules, that stands in the way", because the rules "sometimes also entail losing pieces of the story". Not, however, to the point of obstructing the path to the truth that can be procedurally acquired.

Support. *Established: the decree ordering trial and the count of the indictment; the order of 21 May 2026; the prosecution's closing address of 25 June 2026 (pp. 5-7 for the quotations). Our inference: the assessment of the count and of the choice of targets.*

18. The media: the dominant narrative, and those who fed it. The narrative of the conspiracy against Eni was not born in the courts: it preceded, accompanied and followed them in the media, and at every stage it had someone feeding it. 2014: six days after the news of the entry in the register of suspects, the Prime Minister in Parliament (point 1); on 30 October the Control and Risk Committee with Armanina's interview on the agenda, the Director of Institutional Relations as rapporteur. 2015-2016: from the summer of 2015 the news of the Trani and Syracuse investigations leaks out through a series of dispatches from the Rome press agency AGIR, often picked up by other outlets — "Conspiracy against De Scalzi" (10 July 2015, picked up the same day by a national agency), "ENI GATE: investigations continue into the attempts at external delegitimisation of the managers of ENI Spa" (9 October 2015), "False news artfully circulated to weaken the top management of Eni SPA" (18 December 2015), "Sensational developments on the international conspiracy to destabilise ENI's top management: here are the first admissions" (6 May 2016) — which lend credence to the existence of the conspiracy. The investigators of the time already judged them "steered"; an associate of Bigotti has testified that it was Amara who asked AGIR to publish them. Eni had business relations with that agency from 2008 to 2019, for 181,500 euros in subscriptions, and in 2015 was its leading client; the dispatches on the "conspiracy" reached the company's head of media relations and were forwarded by her to the Chief Executive Officer, to the Head of Legal Affairs and to the Director of Institutional Relations, as on 6 May and 4 October 2016; according to Litvack's testimony, the company's Chairwoman had direct relations with the agency; the relations were terminated only in 2019, after the requests of the Public Prosecutor's Office, as with Napag and Fenog. The day after the notices of investigation to the three critics, in July 2016, a senator declared that a "conspiracy against Eni and Matteo Renzi", if true, would be "a most serious action against national security". From May 2016, by contrast, a national daily began to publish the anomalous aspects of that investigation; Eni never showed any doubt about the soundness of the investigations, and the Director of Institutional Relations declared that the conspiracy "seemed a possible thing". 2019: when the narrative begins to

crack — the book “Enigate”, the articles of that daily, the television investigation “L’amara giustizia” (15 April and 22 July 2019) — the General Counsel opens at Dentons, alongside the “AMARA” file, three files for actions for damages: DIALEG/1/2019 “ENIGATE” against the book, from 7 April 2019; DIALEG/3/2019 “IL FATTO” against the publishing company and the journalists who wrote the articles, and DIALEG/4/2019 “REPORT” against Rai and the interviewing journalist, both from 1 October 2019. To the journalists of that programme, in April 2019, Eni had replied in writing that the content of the meeting of 28 July 2014 “can be gathered from reading the transcript or viewing the video recording” (point 3), thus confessing to having it on file, a circumstance later denied in July 2019 at trial. 2020: on 17 November a journalist asks the head of communications whether the Chief Executive Officer too is under investigation, with the Director of Institutional Relations, in the proceedings known as “depistaggio” (obstruction/misdirection of an investigation); at 12:36 the General Counsel informs the Chief Executive Officer’s defence counsel of this, and at 12:37 attributes the leak to Armanna, who “having received a copy of the record, saw Claudio among the suspects and ‘passed on’ the information”; the article comes out on the 18th. 2021-2026: the counter-narrative had its means, and it had them from the State: Amara’s secret records on “Ungheria” came out in 2021 and the investigation died in its cradle (point 2); whoever first let them out, in February 2020, still has no name (point 13). The prosecutor, in the closing address, said that he had had to reconstruct from scratch facts that a counter-investigation had just “reconstructed” — and, we add, with the media having already decided everything. The accusations against the undersigned, triggered just after the start of the trial and aggravated in parallel with his procedural initiatives, found the same echo in the media: we record this as our assessment. Against this sequence the civil party has not set interviews: it has filed documents — criminal complaints (denunce), criminal complaints (querele: a complaint by the injured party) and complaints (esposti), all with date and number, verifiable. We contend that the dominant narrative was not a spontaneous effect of public opinion, but the product of a continuous activity, in part paid for by the company, in part fed by its lawyer, in part countenanced by political power; and that the same legal structure that managed the intelligence also managed the actions against those who were cracking it.

Support. Established: the parliamentary records of 17 September 2014; record No. 287 of 30 October 2014; the AGIR dispatches of 2015-2016 (civil party’s exhibit B.19) and the documentation on the Eni-AGIR business relations 2008-2019 with the 2015 client list (civil party’s exhibit filed on 15 November 2024); the forwarding e-mails of 6 May and 4 October 2016; the Dentons files DIALEG/1, 3 and 4 of 2019 and the e-mails of 17 November 2020 (note of the Guardia di Finanza of 4 July 2025); Eni’s written reply of April 2019; the prosecution’s closing address of 25 June 2026. Stated: the testimony of Bigotti’s associate on who requested the dispatches; Litvack’s testimony on the Chairwoman; the assessment of the investigators of the time; the remark of the Director of Institutional Relations. Press source, qualified as such: the senator’s statement. Our inference: the orchestration, and the link with the legal structure.

19. The position of the civil party, and the silence of the defences. Hence the position that the civil party holds at trial. The undersigned, in numerous filings, has asked that the evidence of the calumny now charged against Armanna and Amara to the detriment of the top management should fall, and that the accusation formulated in 2019 be reinstated: so that it may be established that the calumny he suffered — and with him the OPL 245 prosecutor, with whom he has not and has never had any connection — was willed by the company’s top management. In two and a half years of trial none of the defences, including those of the two who appear in it as injured parties, has rebutted those arguments. That silence is not evidence, we know; that it is, in an adversarial trial, the only answer received so far, is a fact, and as such we record it.

Support. Established: the documents filed by the civil party and the hearing records. The silence of the defences is a procedural fact, not evidence, and as such we use it.

20. What we infer from it, and where the inference may fall. We do not assert, as a theorem, that there exists a unitary direction which, from 2014 to the present day, has directed judicial offices, State apparatuses and companies. We affirm three things, and we keep them distinct. The first is established: between 2015 and 2018 two Public Prosecutor’s Offices were bent to a private interest (or perhaps also a public one, given the extremely close Eni-State connection), and the judicial function was used to calumniate the presumed internal enemies of the State-owned company. The second is documentary: from July 2019

the company financed, through its own General Counsel and behind the screen of two law firms, an apparatus of intelligence and illicit dossier-building on its own accusers, and out of that apparatus came — or in any event passed through it — the false documents filed with the Public Prosecutor's Office on 20 February 2020. There are no serious alternative explanations. The third is inferential, and it is the only one that we ask to have verified: that the two opposite uses of the same corpus, the silence about the fake chat, the seventy-six seconds of 5 February 2020, the failure to investigate the 2019-2021 biennium and the request for dismissal of the GC for want of intent in March 2026 are not errors independent of one another, but the way in which a legal system avoids looking at the set of facts which it is politically inopportune to look at. The inference falls if someone shows that the comparison between the two chats was made and gave a negative result; if the two nameless computers are identified and turn out to belong to the telephone's holder; if there exists a judicial assessment of Operation Grey that we do not know of. None of the three, to date, is on record. The alternative explanations that we have been able to construct — and we have constructed them, one by one — explain each fact taken on its own; none explains the series. What is on record is that every time the whole threatened to come together — a joinder of the trials, an investigation into the seventy-six seconds, a comparison between two chats, a criminal complaint that closed the circle — the coming-together was denied, deferred or dismissed.

(synthesis - what we contend - v13, English text of the Italian v13)